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Abstract
We develop methods for assessing the typicality of the file system of a computer.  This is helpful in analyzing, for instance,
captured terrorist machines to decide if their information is genuine and for testing whether a honeypot is convincing.  We have
implemented a program that computes 28 metrics on a file system including features such as the average number of files per
directory, the average number of programs per directory, the length of an average filename, the size of the average file, and the
average time the file was last modified.  We also can infer analogous directories with different names or paths on two file systems. 
We show that comparing the metrics can reveal a reasonably convincing "fake" file system created using random selections from
Web page names at our institution together with some other random choices.  We conclude with some discussion of possible
improvements incorporating more context.
 
This paper appeared in the Proceedings of the Intelligence Analysis Conference, McLean, Virginia, USA, May 2005.
 
1. Introduction
Consider an enemy?s computer that is captured when an enemy operations center is overrun by an army unit.  The magnetic disk of the
computer could contain valuable intelligence about the enemy.  It could indicate enemy operations, personnel, weapons, and planning, and
in a convenient, easy-to-use package.  Even if key secrets are encrypted, many important things cannot be: programs, program-process data,
and system-resource data.  And encryption can be broken if the encryption key can be found or extracted, or if a gimmicked encryption
program is substituted for a correct one.  So an enemy will undoubtedly realize the dangers of their computers falling into our hands or being
secretly accessed by us.  They may then attempt counterespionage, deliberate insertion of false information, on those computers as an active
form of counterintelligence.  Our attempted exploitation of such planted information could be damaging to us.
 
The challenge is to decide when information provided in a computer's files is fake.  Fake information can be created by computer programs
to look much like real information, more easily than fake physical documents (Rendell, 1994) which can be betrayed by handwriting,
medium, and provenance, clues not nearly as available in cyberspace.  Many of the contextual clues that intelligence analysts use to measure
the authenticity of intelligence are lacking in digital information: source, timing, and manner of presentation.  The potential spectrum of fake
digital information is broad.  Fake parameters like the targets in air plans are easy to design, while fake narrative like news reports is often
too difficult to construct except by highly skilled experts.  But an interesting class of intermediate documents are now becoming suitable for
automatic construction of fakes: file systems of computer systems, the directories and their files.  Fake file systems are essential to
information-security tools called "honeypots" (The Honeynet Project, 2004), computer systems designed solely to attract attackers to
provide decoy targets and enable study of their attack methods.  Honeypots have become increasingly important in the last few years as part
of a complete security strategy for organizations.  It would be useful to have a software tool to assess the convincingness of such a file
system.  This paper will present such a tool and associated software, and describe the approach used to develop them.
2. A fake file system
Simulating a file system on a computer means providing realistic-looking files, directories, and associated data like sizes and modification
dates.  For a honeypot, the files must also look interesting.  Just copying the file system of another computer will probably not do, because
identical things on different computers (other than the operating system and software) are unusual and hence suspicious.  However, a too-
simple mechanical method for generating fake information may be easy to discern.  So some care is necessary to design a fake file system.
 
As an example, we developed a simple prototype FDir, a Web site that provides directory and file information for a set of nonexistent
directories and files (Rowe, 2004a).  Figure 1 is an example view of the top level, a display that imitates Microsoft MS-DOS or ?Command
Prompt? listings of directories.  Users can click on the names of directories to see similar listings for subdirectories, and they can click on
names files to see fake file contents of various kinds.  Some of the files appear to be encrypted as in Figure 2.  Some files give error
messages when the user attempts to open them, including several kinds of authorization and access errors to suggest secrets are being stored;
some files listed as large cause an ?out of space? error after a long wait.  The openable files show images with captions taken from actual
image-caption pairs on Web pages at our School.  However, the directory paths to these are often are different from their originals because
each directory includes a few randomly added subdirectories, and long paths are likely to have at least one; for instance, an image of a
meteorological satellite system (Figure 3) is located in the directory for the Snort intrusion-detection system.  The random connections
encourage viewers will see connections between unrelated things, a useful strategy for counterespionage since intelligence personnel are
especially looking for unexpected connections.  With Figure 3 for instance, it appears that satellites are spying on intruders.
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Nofi, 2001).  Deception is especially facilitated in information systems because of
the frequent lack of visual and aural clues that might reveal it.  So we are seeing
increases in Internet scams and frauds (Mintz, 2002).  Sophisticated scams can
even be accomplished with honeypot technology (Rong & Yang, 2003) although
this has not happened yet.  Deliberate deception has been proposed as a defensive
technique for information systems in general (Gerwehr et al, 2000; Rowe, 2004b),
and fake music files are being used to attack music-sharing services by cluttering
them with junk (Kushner, 2003).
 
Detecting deception is the key skill in counterintelligence.  (Whaley & Busby, 2003) suggests that such counterintelligence is very difficult
and requires a special kind of personality, someone adept at connecting pieces and seeing discrepancies.  Discrepancies are the key (Heuer,
1982) because as deceptions try to accomplish major goals, they can become too elaborate to coordinate.  But discrepancies can require
patience to find (Johnson et al, 2001), and automated tools could be useful, especially with online data which is already digital.  Simple clues
are available with speech and text to suggest where to look, such as sentence length, complexity, specificity, and informality (Qin, Burgoon,
and Nunamaker, 2004).  Mathematical models can be built of the likelihood of various events and these can be tracked dynamically
(Carofiglio, de Rosis, & Castelfranchi, 2001; Yu & Singh, 2003).  Discrepancies can be either individual (specific unusual events) or
aggregate (on statistics of groups of events).  This is analogous to the distinction in automated ?intrusion detection systems? for defending
computer systems from attack (Proctor, 2001) between misuse detection and anomaly detection, the two major approaches.  However,
defining unusual events is generally quite specific to the details of operating systems, whereas results of statistical analysis of computer
systems are more robust over a wide range of systems.  Thus we explore a anomaly-based statistical approach here. 
4. Building a fake file system
To detect a fake file system, we must characterize the population of "normal" file systems that the fake attempts to imitate.  For instance, if
we want to fake an office-staff computer at a military base, we have the population of all office-staff computers there.  Then a good
approach is to make the fake some kind of average of the population.  The averaging can be like a mean (for numeric parameters like file
sizes and number of files in an average directory), or like a median (for the ?most representative? memo), or like a mode (for the software
loaded on the most machines), or like a random selection from a subpopulation (for a network log file created by randomly choosing lines
from many log files).  For more realism, averages can be done for subparts of the file systems, so for instance we compute an average ?bin?
directory from only the other ?bin? directories.  Several situations can occur:
·         The corresponding items are identical, as with executables in different installations of the same operating system.  Then it is
important to include this item in the fake.
·         The corresponding items are similar but differ in quantitative metrics like size.  Then the fake should be similar with some
appropriate ?average? metric.
·         The corresponding items are mostly different but follow patterns.  Then a stochastic grammar could be inferred and used to
generate new random items.  Such a grammar must take into account contextual parameters like the use of a user's name in files.
·         Some corresponding items are absent.  Then the average item should be used with probability equivalent to the fraction of times it
is present.
·         Some corresponding items have considerably more elaborate structure than others, as when one system has an empty directory
where another has a directory filled with files.  Then a stochastic grammar can be used to generate the necessary tree and fill it with
plausible random structure.
 
Appropriate choice of an averaging method is important to minimize discrepancies in a fake file system.  It must also take into account the
likelihood of the whole file system, not just the pieces.  For instance, an earlier version of the fake-directory site used file and directory
7/22/13 10:40 AMAutomatic Detection of Fake File Systems
Page 5 of 8http://faculty.nps.edu/ncrowe/fakeintel.htm
names like ?horcalp? and ?qmcb833? generated by a stochastic context-free grammar (a set of rules with associated probabilities where one
symbol on the left side is replaced by a sequence of symbols on the right side).  The grammar was mostly phonetic, so it would try to
alternate vowels with consonants to make the result more pronounceable, a feature often seen with operating-system filenames.  The
tendency of computer programmers to overuse abbreviations (although eight-character filenames are rarely required anymore) means many
operating-system filenames do look this way.  However, whole directories of such filenames are rare and look suspicious; file and directory
names drawn randomly from real online files and directories are much more convincing.  So for our FDir prototype, we used names drawn
from all the Web sites at our School.
 
Note that corresponding files may have different paths on different computers; for instance, application executables could be stored under ?
c:/Program Files? under Windows and under ?/app1? under Unix.  Matching will need to find the correspondence.
5. A first-order probabilistic model
Let us apply these ideas to assess the realism of a file system.  We can use statistics on real directories.  Part of this is the likelihood of each
individual file or directory listing, what we call ?first-order? information.  For instance in Figure 1, ?Docs?, ?ICON?, ?Travel?, and ?admin?
are all common names of directories for online information about organizations.  If we do not have enough statistics on a word to estimate
its likelihood, we can use those of its superconcepts (the upward type pointers) and synonyms like those provided by the Wordnet thesaurus
system (Miller et al, 1990) and assume an even apportionment of counts among sibling concepts.  For instance, if we do not have any
statistics on the filename ?herpetology?, we can note it is one of 30 subdivisions of ?biology?, and divide the count on biology by 30 to
estimate a count on ?herpetology?.  Reasoning about the counts of superconcepts and synonyms is a form of ?statistical inheritance?.  For
this analysis, we should split words into subwords when we can; announcement_april_01_2002_picture.html is plausible because each of its
words is common.  Acronyms like CMDC, GSOIS, and RSL are rare but plausible because short acronyms are common in organizations.
 
We can also assign likelihoods for other information about files.  For our fake directory system, the extensions ?htm?, and ?html" are
familiar, "rzp" looks similar to the common ?zip?, and "cry" suggests ?cryptographic?, a plausible adjective for a file.  We can also assess
the likelihoods of the file sizes (the third item on every line of Figure 1) using the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of their
logarithms, which tends to be normally distributed.  As for dates and times, we can also compute a mean and standard deviation, but it is
also helpful to obtain the mean within the day, within the week, and within the year to see periodic patterns.  A vector average of unit
vectors is appropriate for periodic values, where the direction of the vector corresponds to time modulo the period.  We can also measure
typicality of substructures of files, such as how often a document has an abstract or a graphical header.
 
Although there can be considerable variation in the features of individual files, statistics on directories are less variable and thus more useful
for assessing the reasonableness of a file system.  For instance, we can count the average, standard deviation, median, largest value, and
smallest value for the size of a file in a directory, the number of characters in the filename, or the date it was last modified.  Directories that
differ significantly in any of these statistics from those of a population of typical directories are suspicious.  We can define ?significantly? by
the population standard deviation.  For instance, if the largest filename in a sample of typical directories is 25 characters with a standard
deviation of 20, then a filename of length 65 in a given test directory is two standard deviations from expected and thus has only a 4%
chance of being due to chance, and is therefore suspicious.  We can add the degrees of significance of individual metrics to get a cumulative
metric of significance.   
6. Experiments with a file-system metric tool
As a testbed for these ideas, we developed a software tool in Java to assess the characteristics of a file system.  An advantage of Java is that
the same class file can analyze a file system on any machine with the Java Run-Time Environment, including Windows, Linux, and Unix
machines.  The tool calculates 28 metrics on each directory of a file system.  The metrics were chosen to reflect features most obvious in a
quick inspection of directories: the form and types of filenames, the types of files, the sizes of files, the date distribution, and the shape of the
directory tree.  The simple metrics used were the number of files in the directory, the depth of the directory in the file hierarchy, the number
of system files in the directory, the number of document files, the number of image files, the number of Web files, the number of program
source files, and the number of filenames that were known English words.  The aggregating metrics -- for each of which we calculated the
mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum -- were the filename length, the natural logarithm of the size of the file (or directory
data) in bytes, when the file was last modified, the time within the day that the file was last modified, and the number of pieces in the
filename as separated by punctuation marks, typeface case changes, or digits.  Our program calculated these 28 metrics for each directory
and its subdirectories as well as standard errors on each metric.  Table 1 shows some example metrics for five systems a our school: (1) a
computer-science Unix file server at our school, (2) an operations-research Unix file server, (3) an oceanography Unix file server, (4) our
office desktop Windows machine, (5) and the Linux machine of a colleague.  There are differences, but some surprising similarities too.
 
Table 1: Ten representative metrics on five file systems.
Metric Sys. 1 Sys. 2 Sys. 3 Sys. 4 Sys. 5
Total files 215814 50860 315678 81346 2,515,746
Av. dir. size 19.2 18.2 76.3 18.5 76.3
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We can then compare two file systems as a whole by comparing the metrics for their top-level directories, which include statistics on everything
beneath them.  Comparing whether two metrics are statistically significant is a classic problem in statistics, for which it is reasonable to assume a
normal distribution and a standard error of the square root of the sum of the squares of the standard deviations of the metrics.  Thus we use 
as our measure of significance for an individual metric.  We can average this over the 28 statistics to get an overall
level of significance.
As an example, we used our tool to compare metrics of our entire fake directory system (the original version before we made improvements
suggested by this analysis) with those of five machines around our office: Two Windows machines, two Unix machines, and one Macintosh.
Results are shown in Table 2.  There were 453,974 fake file and directory names, and 126,930 real files in the two Windows systems.  Signed
standard errors were computed as in the table: Negative numbers mean the fake?s value was larger than the Windows systems? value.
Table 2: Comparison of the 28 metrics between five real and one fake file system.
Directory size -2.34 Depth 1.00 Number of system
files
















-1.50 Minimum 2.00 Maximum -1.11
Average file size 0.46 Standard
deviation
-3.20 Minimum 0.30 Maximum -2.22
Average date 3.31 Standard
deviation










-1.00 Minimum 0.25 Maximum -0.85
 
The average error over the 28 statistics was 1.59, as contrasted with 0.13 in comparing the two Windows systems.  It appears that the
standard deviations and the maxima for file-system metrics were generally too small; we were attempting to avoid seeming too unusual, but
went too far.  Dates in the fake system were too early, but some real computer systems not used recently are like this.  The fake system had
too many files per directory and too many English-word filenames (since they came from Web pages).  But all these factors are easy to
adjust.  Our tool also compares corresponding subdirectories, which is useful because matching importance varies considerably: Similarities
of software directories are much more important than similarities of user directories.  Note that a better strategy might be to compare to one
normal system that is the closest to what the fake imitates.
 
Equivalent directories on different computers may have different names and paths (since, for instance, software can be installed in many
places).  So we wrote an additional tool to automatically infer apparently equivalent but differently-named directories.  Examples we found
were:
·         c:/Documents and Settings/Neil Rowe maps to c:/Documents and Settings/Williams
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·         c:/Program Files/Java/j2re1.4_01 maps to c:/jsdk1.4.2_01/jre
·         /work/ssiripal/java/demo/jfc/Java2D/src maps to c:/j2sdk1.4.2_01/demo/plugin/jfc/Java2D /src/java2d
This tool searches for pairs of directories that (a) have more than a threshold number (we used 10 in experiments) of subdirectories in
common, and (b) differ by no more than a threshold (we used 20) in the sum of the count deviations for the five types of files.  Using it we
found 379 such mappings between directories for 10,068 directories on the four representative file systems, and these mappings created
4636 additional aggregations of statistics for the directories.  We then applied these mappings and recalculated the statistics on the merged
directories.  No significant difference was observed with our test directories, but we expect there will be improved accuracy with a more
realistic fake file system.
7. Further modeling issues
Our prototype comparator tool can detect some obvious honeypots, but it cannot detect discrepancies due to overly similar files.  For
instance, we expect every system to have directory names including the names of the main users; if these names are the same on every
machine of a local-area network, they are suspicious.  This can be detected by calculating statistics on the mappings between systems found
by our mapping tool described above.  System pairs with a too-low number of possible mappings (that is, for which too many files and
directories are identical) are suspicious.
 
We also can examine "second-order" statistics on relationships; relationship analysis is central in intelligence (Coffman, Greenblatt, &
Markus, 2004).  For instance, we can count how often two files occur together in a directory.  Many relationship discrepancies are reduced
in our fake-directory tool by choosing file names for a directory from the same real-world directory, but there are too many relationships to
fake all of them.  The main problem with using second-order probabilities is that their statistics are considerably sparser than first-order
statistics.  Thus we need to do statistical inheritance from larger populations of files and directories and generalized properties of them; for
instance, we can look at the number of times a synonym for ?project? occurred as a subdirectory under a directory name that was a branch of
engineering.
 
A different issue that arises in counterintelligence is the effectiveness of the supplied fake information, a factor which acts counter to
plausibility.  For instance, the most plausible of fake air targeting orders for spies to find would be those closest to real orders, since good
decision-making is usually best represented in the real orders.  But deceptions too close to reality are ineffective.  So a tradeoff must be
made.
8. Conclusion
We have developed a theory of plausibility of the file system of a computer using its typical characteristics.  To go with this theory we have
built two main tools, one that builds realistic-looking fake file systems, and one that calculates statistics on file systems and compares them
to see if they are significantly different.  The tools can be used for both intelligence and counterintelligence, to both build honeypots and to
test the convincingness of honeypots.  But clearly much further work is possible by incorporating mapping statistics, second-order effects,
and effectiveness ratings into our tools.
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